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Abstract 
In nine cases of firms which closed, productivity increases were experienced after 
negotiations with the affected employees were finalised, up until the final day. This 
productivity change is known as ‘the closedown effect’. Possible explanations for this effect 
reveals, contrary to the explanations to the Hawthorne effect, that Management’s interest in 
the labour process were fading away, hence we witness “Management by absence”.  
 
Several scholars have pointed out that subjectivity matters and we use a labour process theory 
framework to address subjectivity; primarily, Michael Burawoy´s concept of the games 
associated with “making out”. Although Burawoy mainly discusses piece work situations, he 
also states that the games employees play also applies in the assembly work context. 
Furthermore the concepts of ‘rate-breakers’ and ‘working to rule’ strategies applied by 
workers to control their pace of work are relevant to this research. Labour (individually and 
collaboratively) regularly attempt to gain an increased level of control over their work 
situation. 
 
The frontier of control is shifted when a closedown decision is made by top management.  A 
common feature in the temporary closedown organisations studied was that productivity 
increased in a situation where management control over daily operations was diminishing. 
Managers were providing greater autonomy to those that they supervise, empowering them 
both formally and informally to make decisions over work. The causal pattern in closedown 
processes is that a reordering appears of the organizational and economic structure, knocking 
out the established order and changing the frontiers of control. These changes are analysed in 
this paper. 
 
Introduction 
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In nine reported cases of firms which closed, with comparably long closedown periods, a 
productivity increase has been reported. This productivity increase has been referred to as the 
Closedown effect (Bergman & Wigblad 1999, Hansson & Wigblad 2006a, Lewer 2006). The 
productivity increase appears ideal-typical after the negotiations with the affected employees 
were finalised, up until the final day of operation. Although eight out of nine cases are from 
Sweden, where we have been able to find a large sample of comparably long closedown 
periods, the findings seems to be generalizable in manufacturing industry. The nine cases 
considered in this study show a substantial variety and range of organisations from pulp and 
steel as capital intensive process production, to glass, steelwires, doors and tires, that were 
more labour intensive. The pay systems used range from monthly pay systems based on 
different parameters (age, skills, years employed etc) to piece rate systems. The researchers 
entered all cases before the Closedown effect appeared, and each case has supported the 
thesis. The robust nature of the Closedown effect was also strengthened, by a test that tried to 
the overrule the veracity, by researchers (Hansson & Wigblad 2006). What is yet to be 
explained is the possible causes of the closedown effect – an effect that is only depending on 
the subjective reactions of the workers.   
 
Several scholars have pointed out that subjectivity matters, and needs to be brought in to the 
research agenda (Knights 1990, Willmot 1990). Bergman & Wigblad (1995) pointed out that 
this is necessary when studying closedowns, since the closedown decision is something that 
provides discomfort and stress for all parties involved. The seminal work on labour process 
theory of Braverman (1974) tends, according to criticism from Edwards and Burawoy, to 
overemphasize the technological control determinism. Edwards presented a theory of 
bureaucratic control, suggesting that bureaucratic rules are one effective control mechanism 
for larger sized operations. Yet, we understand that systems of bureaucratic control are 
inevitably inefficient, and workers tend to develop strategies to resist these managerial 
controls. For example, Burawoy (1979) demonstrates how a “work to rule” strategy can be a 
very effective means of demonstrating the inefficiencies and sometimes foolishness of the 
agenda forwarded by management personnel. As we will discuss shortly, Burawoy suggests 
that there is always some level of freedom for workers even in very Tayloristic work 
organizations. This freedom demonstrates the fluid notion of the frontier of control because it 
can often allow employees to gain higher levels of control over their work when that is 
something that they seek. Focussing on this freedom and fluidity of levels of control makes 
subjectivity visible.  
 
Burawoy’s concept, the“game of making out” primarily discusses the rules of “the game” in 
piece work situations (Burawoy 1979). Whilst Blauner (1964) presents a Marxist analysis 
explaining forms of alienation that employees feel under capitalist modes of production, 
Burawoy explains how subjectivity can be used to reduce the impact of the alienation. Central 
to the arguments presented by Roy (1952, 1954) and Burawoy (1979) is that employees can 
be seen as a player of a game in which they have not been allowed to determine any of the 
rules. When opportunities arise for the employees to have a greater level of control over the 
labour process they are now able to engage in determining the ‘rules’ of the game. One aspect 
of the game played is to create restrictions of output. That is, to work slower than one is able 
for the benefit of the employee and co-workers rather than the benefit of management and the 
organisation. Conversely, a ‘rate-breaker’  refers to workers who  work at a rate faster than 
the expected norm, most commonly for the benefit of only that worker and often to the 
detriment of co-workers.  In this instance, the ‘rate-breaker’ works in such a way that the 
organisation also benefits. Labour (individually and collaboratively) regularly attempts to gain 
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an increased level of control over their work situation. Burawoy (1985: 37) also states that 
this piece work game also applies for assembly work.  
 
The frontier of control shifts when a closedown decision is made by top management. This is 
because the workplace has reached “the end of the game”. No longer does the game of 
making out fit our analytical framework. Management do not demand increased productivity 
measures any longer and workers do not need to act and react to managerial control measures. 
A common feature in the temporary closedown organisations studied was that productivity 
increased when management control over daily operations was diminishing. Managers were 
providing greater autonomy to those that they supervise, empowering them both formally and 
informally to make decisions over their work and daily responsibilities. The causal pattern in 
closedown processes is that a reordering appears of the organizational and economic structure, 
knocking out the established order and changing the frontiers of control (Wigblad & Lewer 
2007).  
 
This paper address whether the changes in the frontiers of control increases degrees of 
freedom or means totally changed control. We first to take a closer look at the theoretical and 
empirical development of the closedown effect phenomenon. We also analyze what 
developments in labour process theory are relevant in this context. Comparing the two 
theoretical areas generate a propositional answer to the question concerning what kind of 
control that appears in closedown factories. 
 
Theory 
 
Exploring the Closedown effect 
 
Managers who have planned closures for the first time have reported that they expected that 
productivity would fall because workers, their collective agencies and possibly the wider 
community are dealing with resentment, future uncertainty and concerns over job loss. 
Sometimes, this anticipation comes true during the time period immediately following the 
announcement of the closure decision. However after a few months, and contrary to these 
expectations, strong counterintuitive improvements in productivity have been recorded in 
some cases during the end of the closedown period. Bergman and Wigblad (1999) refer to this 
‘unexpected, puzzling social phenomenon’ as the ‘closedown effect’, for which a final 
explanation, they proposed, was yet to be found. 
 
Exploring possible explanations for the Closedown effect reveals that it is not a Hawthorne 
effect, if we follow the classical interpretation of the Hawthorne experiments (Hansson & 
Wigblad 2006b). Researchers have claimed that the Hawthorne effect was that increases in 
labour productivity were largely due to the attention that the researchers and managers paid to 
the workers in the test room. As the attention from researchers and managers subsided over 
time, the work groups grew stronger and assumed more control over the day-to-day 
operations (c f Adair 1984). The Hawthorne effect—i.e. non-specific effects caused by 
participants knowing they are the subjects of a study—has been taken into consideration in a 
great many research experiments, to ensure that no known or unknown biases are present in 
experiments.  
 
The experimental effect of the Hawthorne studies was based on the attention paid to the 
operators by the researchers and management. In cases of closedown, the opposite has been 
observed, since operations management is changed or reduced as the closedown proceeds. 
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Despite these distinct dissimilarities, the operators and workers in both Hawthorne and 
closedowns enjoyed some degree of autonomy. Increased work effort, which was perhaps a 
result of the distinctly more pleasant working conditions and a freeing up of managerial 
restrictions on worker actions in the Hawthorne experiments, creates greater freedom, with 
less strict supervision and the opportunity to diverge from a fixed pace without being 
reprimanded (Mayo 1933). Together with the development of greater autonomy, informal 
leadership and informal groups have also appeared in the Hawthorne studies as well as in the 
cases where the closedown effect has been observed (e.g. Sutton, 1987; Bergman & Wigblad, 
1999, Hansson & Wigblad 2006b). 
 
A closedown decision creates a temporary organization during the period of the closedown 
concerned. If the period of the temporary organization is prolonged, then it becomes possible 
to see the situation as an action experiment in a real-life organization. There are no 
mechanisms of control in the temporary closedown organization, and yet many types of 
improvements are needed. The whole organization focuses on the task of maintaining 
production. Somewhat paradoxically, productivity rises when the means of control over 
everyday production operations are reduced, when investment is lacking and the commitment 
and attention from management are both low (Bergman & Wigblad, 1999). 
 
Management control was an important and strong presence in the Hawthorne experiments. 
Management took an active part in conducting the process of the action experiment, and 
limited the operative space of the workers (Hansson & Wigblad 2006b). Furthermore, 
Homans interpretation of the Bank Wiring Room Experiment – group norms, such as 
restrictions of output, were “spontaneously produced” so as to preserve the integrity of the 
group. On the contrary, in all closedown cases, management control over daily production 
operations is reduced, and productivity increased (Bergman & Wigblad, 1999). Operations 
could be sped up, since the workers could focus upon their given task and without being 
distracted by other problems or issues in the organization. 
 
Case studies and findings regarding the closedown effect suggest that unexpected increases in 
productivity during the countdown period may have a variety of context-specific causes. One 
trivial cause is that operations can be sped up by working more intensively. This depends on 
an environment favourable to raised piece-rates, and on production management deciding that 
there is no further need to save equipment from excessive wear (Bergman & Wigblad, 1999). 
Further, there is a certain psychological explanation of the increased productivity, as 
uncertainty expresses itself in stress-releasing certainty/activity (Sutton, 1987). 
 
Bergman & Wigblad (1999) observe that productivity fluctuates throughout a closedown 
process, primarily due to the way employees interpret the information they are given and the 
situation as they encounter it. Moreover, the workers’ collective reacts, influencing efforts and 
performance on the floor. In addition, the evolution of an informal leadership within the 
workers’ collective often affects productivity: not surprisingly, negative reactions to a 
closedown decision will often have a negative effect, but it has also been observed that an 
initial drop in productivity is retrieved as the psychological stress, anxiety and general 
emotion simmer down. The workers often take pride in their work and want to show 
management that the closedown decision was wrong (Bergman & Wigblad, 1999; Hansson, 
2004).  
 
Bergman and Wigblad (1999) argue further that within closedown plants innovative skills 
acquired through individual and collective experiences at work can flourish. These skills can 
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find operative space within the worksite allowing for an increase in scope for worker 
autonomy. The reason for this is rather straightforward. To a large extent the managers and 
supervisors lose interest in maintaining the established order as the organization now 
maintains a very limited lifespan. Plans for operations, including major investments, no longer 
head the management agenda. Further, in some cases as management’s control over daily 
operations diminishes and productivity actually increases. 
 
Testing an elaborated cybernetic model, adapted from Buckley (1967), on a Swedish case 
study, and on an exploratory basis, Wigblad, Lewer and Hansson (2007) proposes a holistic 
approach to generate a better understanding of this phenomenon. The main holistic pattern 
identified is a new order where management control is replaced by more “self-management” 
on the plant level, and very strong psychological reactions based on feelings of unfairness in 
the closedown decision.  
 
Empirical work by Bergman and Wigblad (1999); Lewer (2005); Brown, et al. (XXXX); 
Hansson (2005); Hansson and Wigblad (2006a), showed that an altered frontier of control 
between labour and management in the changed conditions brought about by the closure 
announcement, facilitated more productive work conditions. In effect, managers ‘retreat’ from 
the shopfloor, thereby providing greater autonomy or control to the workforce. Sometimes 
this is necessitated as workers leave and are not replaced, during the closedown period. This 
provides opportunities for the development of innovative skills, extension of job-sharing 
arrangements, improved informal leadership and self-organizing work groups, while planning 
is deployed to the lower levels in the hierarchy. Significantly less formalized work patterns 
commonly emerge which often leads to the release of the inefficiencies of the bureaucracy 
(Hansson, 2005; Lewer, 2005, Hansson & Wigblad 2006a, Wigblad, Lewer & Hansson 2007). 
 
The overall dominating pattern is that by making the decision to close the plant, the top 
management deprive themselves from their status quo positions of maintaining the regime of 
control. At first during the advance notice period they still have bargaining power and can 
reject propositions from the shop floor and at the same time the workers are in the position to 
react by lowering their performance to put pressure on negotiations. This however, creates a 
blind cybernetic feedback loop, only influencing the economic structure, not the institutional 
structure (Wigblad, Lewer and Hansson, 2007). It is our thesis that during the countdown 
period the management control fades away totally and the temporary new organizational and 
economic order is established, which alter the system tensions into constructive measures. 
This new organizational and economic order releases performance that had previously been 
held back and increases creativity on the shop floor, resulting in a strong increase in 
productivity. The main pattern in the new order is that management control is replaced by 
more “Self-management” on the plant level, and very strong psychological reactions based on 
the unfairness feeling. Underlying these feelings of unfairness is the disagreement concerning 
the close down decision, the decision counteracted on the shop floor, with possible means 
characterized by comments such as "let’s show them”. The new temporary order that is 
established during the countdown period is only local and is by no means reordering the 
institutional structure on the labour market. 
 
In order to verify our theoretically deduced thesis that a new order starts to operate in 
closedown factories when all negotiations are finalized and the rules of closure are confirmed, 
we turn to Burawoy’s labour process theory concerning the core element in management 
control in ordinary contexts (as opposed to extreme situations such as closedowns). 
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Burawoys labour process theory and the game 
 
The research literature on commitment to work, employment, and organization, rarely focuses 
explicitly on the possible effects of conflicting values. Instead, a considerable focus has been 
directed at gender roles and at the influence of family situation on work related attitudes (c f 
Hult, C., 2003). Closedown contexts are usually about strong conflicting values between top 
management and workers on the site. The labour process at the plant is subject to 
rationalization when closedown decisions are made and the workers reactions are usually very 
distinct. The conflict is related to the dialectics of capital and the labour process. 
 
A Marxist perspective of the labour process suggests that capital needs to organise production 
to its own advantage and consequently labour would be disadvantage and may in fact resist 
these conditions. Managerial control is a method to maximise employee output and minimise 
capital expenditure (Hyman, 1975; 1987; Burawoy, 1978).  Braverman suggests that work 
under capitalism is directed to create profits for organisations rather than satisfy the needs of 
working people (Braverman, 1974). Hence, there is a coercive nature to the labour process 
and indeed, to managerial control or managerial prerogative.  
 
Whilst there are a range of theoretical developments to the Marxist view of managerial 
control, the one most relevant to this research is Burawoy’s (1978) interpretation. Formerly, 
the issue of control in the workplace was viewed in a simplistic control/resistance framework. 
Braverman in particular, has been criticized for focussing too greatly on worker resistance and 
not adequately examining worker consent (Burawoy 1985). Any labour process involves 
elements of consent and there is rarely unrestrained hostility (Edwards and Scullion, 1982). 
An important addition to our understanding of the labour process encapsulated a range of 
potential employee responses to managerial control. Burawoy argues that due to the 
interdependence of labour and management, the two parties are obliged to accommodate some 
of the other party’s preferences and expectations. Hence, labour commonly maintains some 
control over issues such as the pace at which work will be performed, the amount that will be 
performed, who is expected to perform particular tasks and so on (Tolliday and Zeitlan, 
1992).  
 
Burawoy claims correctly that the traditional Marxist approach of the control/resistance 
framework does not explain the cooperative nature that can be found in many workplaces by 
the majority of employees much of the time. Furthermore, LPT has been accused of too great 
a level of homogenisation of labour and its interests without adequate consideration of 
individual subjectivity (Sturdy and Fineman, 2001). In part, Burawoy addresses this failure 
through the suggestion that consent in the workplace arises from the organisation of the 
processes in the workplace that leaves employees with the perception that they have choices 
and the ‘participation in choosing … generates consent’ (Burawoy, 1979: 27).  
 
Industrial sociology provides a well established recognition that employees construct ‘games’ 
in an attempt to relieve the frustrations that can appear within repetitive work (Beynon, 1973; 
Roy, 1973; Burawoy, 1978; 1979). Burawoy develops his addition to the ‘control/resistance’ 
framework with an analysis of the ‘games’ that employees play to tolerate the difficult aspects 
of the labour process and the oft-times dehumanising workplace environment. Primarily, these 
games are organized around constantly negotiating and re-negotiating the wage/effort bargain. 
The opportunity to gain small victories throughout the day disguises the basic disadvantage of 
workers within capitalism (Kitay 1997). Burawoy himself, through an ethnographic study, 
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was puzzled to find himself ‘breaking (his) back to make out … risking life and limb for that 
extra piece’ (Burawoy, 1979:xi). Burawoy refers to employees ‘making out’ and argues that 
such a term cannot be viewed simply as ‘achieving greater earnings’ (1979: 85). In essence, 
there is a shift from coercion to consensual regimes in the labour process (Thompson, 1989).  
 
Burawoy’s concept – the “game of making out” primarily discusses the rules of the game in 
piece work situations (Burawoy 1979). Furthermore Burawoy (1985:37) holds that this game 
also applies for assembly work, and there are more evidence available that this is the case. 
Hodson (1995) provides a framework of worker resistance that contributes to our 
understanding of employee motivations on the shop floor. Through an analysis of much of the 
extant literature, Hodson presents a range of different examples and explanations of why 
employees engage in particular actions. Much employee resistance to managerial controls in 
the workplace will have a negative impact on labour productivity. Hodson (1995) identify 
four principal agendas of resistance; deflecting abuse, regulating the amount of work, 
attaining autonomy and expanding workers control through participation. We are here 
focusing on the regulation of  output, since the Closedown effect is a output effect. Following 
Hodson (1995) we find restricted output strategies reported by Nichols and Beynon (1977), 
Haraszti (1978), Juravich (1985), Pollert (1981), Montgomery (1979), Stempien (1983) and 
DiFacio (1985). Whilst there can be a strong yet informal peer control over the pace of work 
in relation to games of restricting output, there can be those who do not conform to the 
shopfloor rules.  One who does not join the game of restricting output for the benefit of all 
employees is commonly referred to as a ‘rate-breaker’, ‘hog’, ‘hogger-in’, ‘rooter’, ‘chaser’, 
‘rusher’, ‘runner’ etc (Montgomery 1979:13). “Rate-breakers” are likely to have different 
motivations for their actions; however, stepping outside the employees developed ‘rules’ of 
the game often labels this person as an outsider. The importance of these mechanisms of 
social control in the groups of workers on the shopfloor, makes it important to address the 
collective mechanisms which have been nicely elaborated by Lysgaard.  
 
The technical/economic system according to Lysgaard (1985) is propelled by efficiency and 
profitability and management’s desire for optimal solutions to technical/economic problems. 
The demands are potentially infinite, and the system is unyielding, while the individual has 
limits and seeks security (Lysgard 1985:81). Even though the potential extremes of this 
technical/economic pressure are normally curbed by more humane societal values (Lysgaard 
1985:77), an employee can never feel fully secure against the threat of an ever-accelerating 
working tempo, unfulfilling tasks, or unfair treatments in particular work situations. The 
important point here is the assumption that employees find different ways to cope with this 
pressure. At the group and organizational levels, we find the “workers’ collective” (Lysgaard 
1985).  
 
The workers collective spontaneously reacts against the potentially infinite pressure from the 
technical/economic system. A strong and fully developed collective, operates through social 
control, and through a value system which tends to put the norms in the technical/economic 
system upside down in order to mitigate the pressure and to restore some status to this 
subordinated group. The collective imperatives can be such notions as: you should not put too 
much effort in to your work, you should not be too loyal to your company, and you should 
share the collective’s values and goals above those of the company. It is always a matter of 
“us” and “them,” and, from the collective point of view, the subordinated should never try to 
stand out like a representative of the technical/economic system (Lysgaard 1985). 
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In order for the workers to develop a strong collective there needs to be; physical closeness 
that facilitate interaction among workers; similarity among workers concerning work content, 
payform, working hours etc; a common problem situation among workers that they interpret 
in a similar manner (Lysgaard 1985:145-146). 
 
Empirical evidence 
 
The empirical investigations into the Closedown effect have been difficult. First the effect 
was discovered as serendipity in one case Bergman & Wigblad (1999). Then it was important 
to document several cases in different manufacturing settings, to be able to generalize the 
findings, and test if the phenomena could be falsified (Hansson & Wigblad, 2006a). When we 
found that it appeared in all cases studied, the investigation into why it appeared started to be 
more systematic. Researchers (Hansson & Wigblad, 2006a) found in some cases a different 
productivity pattern during the Negotiation period and the final Countdown period. The 
Closedown effect was appearing persistently during the Countdown period. We still do not 
have full detailed knowledge concerning what really happens on the shop floor during the 
final count down.  More recent case studies reveal the deepest insights to date. We will here 
revisit two case studies already published more extensively elsewhere and focus our attention 
on the control variable. In both cases there are strong workers collectives on the shop floor.  
 
The Fundia wire rod case 
 
Fundia steel was a part of the Rautaruukki Oyj Group and manufactured wire rods, with two 
production units in Scandinavia; Smedjebacken and Mo i Rana. Due to a market downturn in 
Asia and a restructuring plan it was decided that the Smedjebacken plant was to close down. 
The closedown decision was announced in October 1998 and was scheduled to be completed 
within nine months. Management and the local labour union negotiated an extensive HRM 
program for the workers, including severance payments, early retirement, educational 
programs, but management rejected an alternative restructuring plan suggested by local trade 
unions in Smedjebacken. In January 1999 all negotiations were ended and the Countdown 
period of 5 months began. In the beginning of the closedown period, up till January 1999, 
productivity dropped, but then recovered dramatically into an all time high, during spring 
1999.  
 
Research concerning the Fundia Smedjebacken case showed that a number of factors were at 
work, all underpinning the extensive rise in Closedown effect (Wigblad, Lewer & Hansson 
2007). Within the workplace the workers were unsure who and how many of them would be 
offered employment in the same location, but in another production unit. Ultimately eight out 
of 33 employees were made redundant. None of the interviewees reported that they were 
anxious to ensure that they received a good referral or reference from their employer. Notably 
and different from most other closedown cases, no monetary incentives such as productivity 
related bonuses were paid in the Fundia case.  
 
During deliberations about the closedown, Fundia management estimated that employees 
could produce an output of 38 tonnes per hour. 44 tonnes per hour was the average output in 
previous records. The outcome was on average 49 tonnes per hour during spring 1999, during 
the Countdown period and when the research team made interviews. Collectively, the workers 
expressed their sense of hurt pride and were motivated to prove to the Fundia management 
that their estimate was wrong. For example, some employees reported: ‘Let’s show 
management that we can do better than 44 tones per hour – it’s unfair to close down this 
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plant’. Others believed exceptional performance may save the plant, commenting that ‘most 
of us did not think that the production would be terminated’ and ‘we’re not finished before the 
last shift is ended’. It appears that this eternal hope is unjustified in most cases, as it was in the 
Fundia case. For the trade unions, they were able to negotiate from a favourable position, to 
gain a human resource program incorporating retraining, early retirement, job search aid and 
severance payments, but not bonus payments (Wigblad, Lewer & Hansson, 2007). 
 
Importantly for this paper, management control faded during the countdown period allowing 
far greater flexibility in the labour process. It became easier to make day to day operative 
decisions on the shop floor concerning the production process. More informal work practices 
developed especially following the appointment of a shop floor foreman as the plant manager. 
Again, importantly for this case many of these informal changes allowed for positive impacts 
on labour productivity and workplace performance. Changeover and start-up times were 
reported in a number of cases to have been reduced by between ten and 15 minutes. 
Employees also noted a more efficient handling of breakdowns and necessary maintenance 
when the previously tight controls of management were severed. Some temporary job sharing 
activities took place to allow workers time ‘off-site’ for education programs. However, 
overall, no workers left permanently prior to the shut down.  
 
The Gusab case  
 
Gusab Stainless AB (Gusab) was a part of the Sandvik Steel Division and manufactured cold-
heading steel wires. Due to restructuring and reduction of the production capacity within the 
division it was decided that Gusab was to close. The closedown decision was announced in 
January 2002 and was scheduled to be completed within 18 months. Management and the 
local labour union negotiated an extensive HRM program for the workers, including 
severance payments, early retirement, educational programs and a production bonus. In 
March 2003 an opportunity was given to prolong parts of the production. However 
negotiations failed and Gusab continued its countdown. Throughout the closedown process, 
productivity continued to increase and a Closedown effect was recorded. 
 
Interviews at Gusab Stainless AB (Gusab), have revealed that when the closedown decision 
was announced formal group leaders took a responsibility, together with the labour unions on 
handling the situation, encouraging the employees to maintain their production and an attitude 
of leaving the organization with a maintained pride evolved. The formal group leaders 
assigned to different work-groups, shared information concerning the actual situation and got 
responsibility for the day-to-day information to the workers. The formal leaders’ attention and 
presence in the day-to-day activities diminished over time. Throughout the closedown 
process, productivity increased on an aggregated level, still with fluctuations dependent on 
critical events that occurred, such as March 2003 (c.f. Hansson, 2005). 
 
It was also evident, and independently from the critical events, that some people, who were 
not in positions of formal leadership, took a greater responsibility encouraging their 
colleagues and tried to manage the day-to-day activities. The informal leadership grew 
stronger throughout the closedown process, and legitimized by the workers. Due to the 
informal leaders’ actions and a unanimous group-decision, workers continued their work. 
However, the importance of the workers collective diminished and the workers became more 
individualized throughout the closedown process (Hansson, 2005). 
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Throughout the closedown process productivity continued to increase. Successively the order 
stock decreased and the workers got an opportunity to complete all orders in stock, after 
completion, they were free to have time off with full salary for the rest of the closedown 
period. However, the workers denied this offer and continued production according to the 
scheduled closedown process. All of the respondents claimed that no changes in routines, 
processes or activities was conducted; rather they tried to work harder as they wanted to leave 
the organization with pride. In addition, the workers wanted to show Sandvik Steel that the 
decision was wrong and had hopes for a revised decision why they were more careful on 
keeping the machines running, even during coffee breaks. 
 
The productivity declined in May 2002, as can often be the case after formal decisions are 
made. This was followed by negative reactions from the workers. At that time, there was 
interplay between the workers and the labour union. The workers requested the labour union 
to put pressure on the management in order to provide social responsibility for the decision. 
The labour union also tried to extend the life of the organization as they argued that Gusab 
was an important part of the Sandvik Corporation. The willingness to understand the 
arguments of the management was limited, and the labour union could not affect the 
closedown decision. However, they were able to negotiate the HRM program. 
 
The HRM program was discussed and the workers found it to be a fair deal. Within the HRM 
program a payment incentive scheme was developed. This was based on the production and 
the volume sold. The employees got used to a higher salary after a couple of months; and 
soon  came to ignore the imminent closedown, which was evident in the low activity on 
applying for new jobs. The respondents found the bonuses motivatingin the short-term,  but 
slightly less motivating in a long-term perspective.  
 
Other components in the HRM program were job-search aid, training in resume writing, 
educational programs tailored for the single individual and an early-retirement program. The 
HRM program that was established served and served as a foundation for managing the 
closedown process. The labour unions were, despite the closedown decision, pleased with the 
retrenchment agreement in the HRM program. 
 
Prior to the closedown decision, conflicts were few and resolved at an average speed. Work 
was controlled and managed through well-defined policies, procedures and hierarchical 
decision-making. During the pre-notice period, the level of conflicts and disputes was high 
due to the preservative and worker-protecting strategy and counter-arguments regarding the 
closedown decision by the labour union. Consequently, the speed of conflict resolution was 
low. During the negotiation period, the level of conflicts remained high and the willingness of 
resolving conflicts continued to be low. As the countdown period was entered, the level of 
conflicts decreased and when conflicts arose, they were often resolved in a speedy manner. 
 
Here, the level of confidence (or trust) in management is often dependent on the level of 
conflict and speed in conflict resolution. A high degree of conflict and a low speed of conflict 
resolution negatively affect employee motivation. The critical events of the Gusab closedown 
process indicate how workers interpreted management actions and decision-making. For 
example, workers were pleased with how the HRM program was negotiated and later 
presented, conflicts decreased whereas productivity increased. On the other hand, as the 
negotiations with the potential new customer failed to materialize, the level of conflicts 
increased and productivity decreased (temporarily). 
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The level of confidence (or trust) in management plays a significant role. Throughout the 
closedown process, management and control diminish whereas worker autonomy increases. 
Increased worker autonomy positively affects both employee motivation and work-design.  
 
 
Analysis 
 
The productivity increase in the closedown effect is not driven by investments – it is a purely 
human related effect. Workers perception of threat of job loss holds a certain explanatory 
value to the Closedown effect (c.f. Hansson & Wigblad, 2006a). Initially and closely related 
to the closedown decision the threat of job loss generates certain dynamics and affects 
workers level of confidence (or trust) in management. The perception of threat of job loss is 
prevalent from the point of rumours starting to evolve and/or decisions by managers formally 
announced and beyond. 
 
The fact that management control was strong in the Hawthorne experiments, suggests that the 
relative autonomy that appeared was not due to a new order. Management attention to 
workers were exceptional and intense, but was not changing the frontiers of control.  
 
In reported closedown cases on the other hand management´s interest in the labour process 
were fading away – creating a situation with management providing greater real autonomy 
(not “responsible autonomy”) into a situation with “Management by absence”, which changes 
the situation dramatically. Management is no longer interested in the future of the plant and 
are satisfied with “normal” production speed levels, based on records of previous years. 
Management fears that productivity would drop, resulted in a bonus system for workers in the 
Gusab case, but such fear was not present in the Smedjebacken case, where no bonus system 
was implemented.  
 
When management had finalized the negotiations concerning the closedown process, a new 
order was established in both cases. More informal leadership evolved, empowering the 
workers, which resulted in increased productivity levels. This new order is however not 
institutionalized momentaniously. On the contrary – it takes some time of transition for the 
new order to evolve and eventually even replace old institutionalized patterns. The workers 
collective have no counterpart during the Countdown period, since the game that took place 
under more permanent conditions, is over. The longer the closedown period, the stronger 
becomes the impact of the new order, which in turn affects productivity positively. When the 
control string is cut, more relaxed attitudes are spread around on the shop floor. As Burawoy 
might suggest, the workers are gaining a greater opportunity to determine the rules of the 
game in which they are involved – an opportunity that they would not otherwise have 
enjoyed. Furthermore, when the workers collective eventually loosen the grip over workers 
and are not imposing values concerning restrictions to output any more, workers can even 
start to implement new working methods as was found primarily in the Smedjebacken case.  
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